In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: restrict NL80211_ATTR_TXQ_QUANTUM values syzbot is able to trigger softlockups, setting NL80211_ATTR_TXQ_QUANTUM to 2^31. We had a similar issue in sch_fq, fixed with commit d9e15a273306 ("pkt_sched: fq: do not accept silly TCA_FQ_QUANTUM") watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 26s! [kworker/1:0:24] Modules linked in: irq event stamp: 131135 hardirqs last enabled at (131134): [] __exit_to_kernel_mode arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:85 [inline] hardirqs last enabled at (131134): [] exit_to_kernel_mode+0xdc/0x10c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:95 hardirqs last disabled at (131135): [] __el1_irq arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:533 [inline] hardirqs last disabled at (131135): [] el1_interrupt+0x24/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:551 softirqs last enabled at (125892): [] neigh_hh_init net/core/neighbour.c:1538 [inline] softirqs last enabled at (125892): [] neigh_resolve_output+0x268/0x658 net/core/neighbour.c:1553 softirqs last disabled at (125896): [] local_bh_disable+0x10/0x34 include/linux/bottom_half.h:19 CPU: 1 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/1:0 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-gfda5695d692c #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : __list_del include/linux/list.h:195 [inline] pc : __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:218 [inline] pc : list_move_tail include/linux/list.h:310 [inline] pc : fq_tin_dequeue include/net/fq_impl.h:112 [inline] pc : ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0x6b8/0x3b4c net/mac80211/tx.c:3854 lr : __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:218 [inline] lr : list_move_tail include/linux/list.h:310 [inline] lr : fq_tin_dequeue include/net/fq_impl.h:112 [inline] lr : ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0x67c/0x3b4c net/mac80211/tx.c:3854 sp : ffff800093d36700 x29: ffff800093d36a60 x28: ffff800093d36960 x27: dfff800000000000 x26: ffff0000d800ad50 x25: ffff0000d800abe0 x24: ffff0000d800abf0 x23: ffff0000e0032468 x22: ffff0000e00324d4 x21: ffff0000d800abf0 x20: ffff0000d800abf8 x19: ffff0000d800abf0 x18: ffff800093d363c0 x17: 000000000000d476 x16: ffff8000805519dc x15: ffff7000127a6cc8 x14: 1ffff000127a6cc8 x13: 0000000000000004 x12: ffffffffffffffff x11: ffff7000127a6cc8 x10: 0000000000ff0100 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : ffff80009287aa08 x4 : 0000000000000008 x3 : ffff80008034c7fc x2 : ffff0000e0032468 x1 : 00000000da0e46b8 x0 : ffff0000e0032470 Call trace: __list_del include/linux/list.h:195 [inline] __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:218 [inline] list_move_tail include/linux/list.h:310 [inline] fq_tin_dequeue include/net/fq_impl.h:112 [inline] ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0x6b8/0x3b4c net/mac80211/tx.c:3854 wake_tx_push_queue net/mac80211/util.c:294 [inline] ieee80211_handle_wake_tx_queue+0x118/0x274 net/mac80211/util.c:315 drv_wake_tx_queue net/mac80211/driver-ops.h:1350 [inline] schedule_and_wake_txq net/mac80211/driver-ops.h:1357 [inline] ieee80211_queue_skb+0x18e8/0x2244 net/mac80211/tx.c:1664 ieee80211_tx+0x260/0x400 net/mac80211/tx.c:1966 ieee80211_xmit+0x278/0x354 net/mac80211/tx.c:2062 __ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xab8/0x122c net/mac80211/tx.c:4338 ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xe0/0x438 net/mac80211/tx.c:4532 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4903 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4917 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3531 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x27c/0x938 net/core/dev.c:3547 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1678/0x33fc net/core/dev.c:4341 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3091 [inline] neigh_resolve_output+0x558/0x658 net/core/neighbour.c:1563 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:542 [inline] ip6_fini ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: Fix missing lock on sync reset reload On sync reset reload work, when remote host updates devlink on reload actions performed on that host, it misses taking devlink lock before calling devlink_remote_reload_actions_performed() which results in triggering lock assert like the following: WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 1164 at net/devlink/core.c:261 devl_assert_locked+0x3e/0x50 … CPU: 4 PID: 1164 Comm: kworker/u96:6 Tainted: G S W 6.10.0-rc2+ #116 Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-2028TP-DECTR/X10DRT-PT, BIOS 2.0 12/18/2015 Workqueue: mlx5_fw_reset_events mlx5_sync_reset_reload_work [mlx5_core] RIP: 0010:devl_assert_locked+0x3e/0x50 … Call Trace: ? __warn+0xa4/0x210 ? devl_assert_locked+0x3e/0x50 ? report_bug+0x160/0x280 ? handle_bug+0x3f/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x40 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? devl_assert_locked+0x3e/0x50 devlink_notify+0x88/0x2b0 ? mlx5_attach_device+0x20c/0x230 [mlx5_core] ? __pfx_devlink_notify+0x10/0x10 ? process_one_work+0x4b6/0xbb0 process_one_work+0x4b6/0xbb0 […]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: iptables: Fix potential null-ptr-deref in ip6table_nat_table_init(). ip6table_nat_table_init() accesses net->gen->ptr[ip6table_nat_net_ops.id], but the function is exposed to user space before the entry is allocated via register_pernet_subsys(). Let's call register_pernet_subsys() before xt_register_template().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: iptables: Fix null-ptr-deref in iptable_nat_table_init(). We had a report that iptables-restore sometimes triggered null-ptr-deref at boot time. [0] The problem is that iptable_nat_table_init() is exposed to user space before the kernel fully initialises netns. In the small race window, a user could call iptable_nat_table_init() that accesses net_generic(net, iptable_nat_net_id), which is available only after registering iptable_nat_net_ops. Let's call register_pernet_subsys() before xt_register_template(). [0]: bpfilter: Loaded bpfilter_umh pid 11702 Started bpfilter BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000013 PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 2 PID: 11879 Comm: iptables-restor Not tainted 6.1.92-99.174.amzn2023.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Amazon EC2 c6i.4xlarge/, BIOS 1.0 10/16/2017 RIP: 0010:iptable_nat_table_init (net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_nat.c:87 net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_nat.c:121) iptable_nat Code: 10 4c 89 f6 48 89 ef e8 0b 19 bb ff 41 89 c4 85 c0 75 38 41 83 c7 01 49 83 c6 28 41 83 ff 04 75 dc 48 8b 44 24 08 48 8b 0c 24 <48> 89 08 4c 89 ef e8 a2 3b a2 cf 48 83 c4 10 44 89 e0 5b 5d 41 5c RSP: 0018:ffffbef902843cd0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000013 RBX: ffff9f4b052caa20 RCX: ffff9f4b20988d80 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000064 RDI: ffffffffc04201c0 RBP: ffff9f4b29394000 R08: ffff9f4b07f77258 R09: ffff9f4b07f77240 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff9f4b09635388 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff9f4b1a3c6c00 R14: ffff9f4b20988e20 R15: 0000000000000004 FS: 00007f6284340000(0000) GS:ffff9f51fe280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000013 CR3: 00000001d10a6005 CR4: 00000000007706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: ? show_trace_log_lvl (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:259) ? show_trace_log_lvl (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:259) ? xt_find_table_lock (net/netfilter/x_tables.c:1259) ? __die_body.cold (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:478 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:420) ? page_fault_oops (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:727) ? exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:40 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:75 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1470 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1518) ? asm_exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:570) ? iptable_nat_table_init (net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_nat.c:87 net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_nat.c:121) iptable_nat xt_find_table_lock (net/netfilter/x_tables.c:1259) xt_request_find_table_lock (net/netfilter/x_tables.c:1287) get_info (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:965) ? security_capable (security/security.c:809 (discriminator 13)) ? ns_capable (kernel/capability.c:376 kernel/capability.c:397) ? do_ipt_get_ctl (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1656) ? bpfilter_send_req (net/bpfilter/bpfilter_kern.c:52) bpfilter nf_getsockopt (net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:116) ip_getsockopt (net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1827) __sys_getsockopt (net/socket.c:2327) __x64_sys_getsockopt (net/socket.c:2342 net/socket.c:2339 net/socket.c:2339) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) RIP: 0033:0x7f62844685ee Code: 48 8b 0d 45 28 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 37 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 0a c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 15 09 RSP: 002b:00007ffd1f83d638 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000037 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd1f83d680 RCX: 00007f62844685ee RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 00007ffd1f83d670 R09: 0000558798ffa2a0 R10: 00007ffd1f83d680 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd1f83e3b2 R13: 00007f6284 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/iucv: fix use after free in iucv_sock_close() iucv_sever_path() is called from process context and from bh context. iucv->path is used as indicator whether somebody else is taking care of severing the path (or it is already removed / never existed). This needs to be done with atomic compare and swap, otherwise there is a small window where iucv_sock_close() will try to work with a path that has already been severed and freed by iucv_callback_connrej() called by iucv_tasklet_fn(). Example: [452744.123844] Call Trace: [452744.123845] ([<0000001e87f03880>] 0x1e87f03880) [452744.123966] [<00000000d593001e>] iucv_path_sever+0x96/0x138 [452744.124330] [<000003ff801ddbca>] iucv_sever_path+0xc2/0xd0 [af_iucv] [452744.124336] [<000003ff801e01b6>] iucv_sock_close+0xa6/0x310 [af_iucv] [452744.124341] [<000003ff801e08cc>] iucv_sock_release+0x3c/0xd0 [af_iucv] [452744.124345] [<00000000d574794e>] __sock_release+0x5e/0xe8 [452744.124815] [<00000000d5747a0c>] sock_close+0x34/0x48 [452744.124820] [<00000000d5421642>] __fput+0xba/0x268 [452744.124826] [<00000000d51b382c>] task_work_run+0xbc/0xf0 [452744.124832] [<00000000d5145710>] do_notify_resume+0x88/0x90 [452744.124841] [<00000000d5978096>] system_call+0xe2/0x2c8 [452744.125319] Last Breaking-Event-Address: [452744.125321] [<00000000d5930018>] iucv_path_sever+0x90/0x138 [452744.125324] [452744.125325] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Note that bh_lock_sock() is not serializing the tasklet context against process context, because the check for sock_owned_by_user() and corresponding handling is missing. Ideas for a future clean-up patch: A) Correct usage of bh_lock_sock() in tasklet context, as described in Re-enqueue, if needed. This may require adding return values to the tasklet functions and thus changes to all users of iucv. B) Change iucv tasklet into worker and use only lock_sock() in af_iucv.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: padata: Fix possible divide-by-0 panic in padata_mt_helper() We are hit with a not easily reproducible divide-by-0 panic in padata.c at bootup time. [ 10.017908] Oops: divide error: 0000 1 PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 10.017908] CPU: 26 PID: 2627 Comm: kworker/u1666:1 Not tainted 6.10.0-15.el10.x86_64 #1 [ 10.017908] Hardware name: Lenovo ThinkSystem SR950 [7X12CTO1WW]/[7X12CTO1WW], BIOS [PSE140J-2.30] 07/20/2021 [ 10.017908] Workqueue: events_unbound padata_mt_helper [ 10.017908] RIP: 0010:padata_mt_helper+0x39/0xb0 : [ 10.017963] Call Trace: [ 10.017968] [ 10.018004] ? padata_mt_helper+0x39/0xb0 [ 10.018084] process_one_work+0x174/0x330 [ 10.018093] worker_thread+0x266/0x3a0 [ 10.018111] kthread+0xcf/0x100 [ 10.018124] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 [ 10.018138] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 10.018147] Looking at the padata_mt_helper() function, the only way a divide-by-0 panic can happen is when ps->chunk_size is 0. The way that chunk_size is initialized in padata_do_multithreaded(), chunk_size can be 0 when the min_chunk in the passed-in padata_mt_job structure is 0. Fix this divide-by-0 panic by making sure that chunk_size will be at least 1 no matter what the input parameters are.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: xc2028: avoid use-after-free in load_firmware_cb() syzkaller reported use-after-free in load_firmware_cb() [1]. The reason is because the module allocated a struct tuner in tuner_probe(), and then the module initialization failed, the struct tuner was released. A worker which created during module initialization accesses this struct tuner later, it caused use-after-free. The process is as follows: task-6504 worker_thread tuner_probe <= alloc dvb_frontend [2] ... request_firmware_nowait <= create a worker ... tuner_remove <= free dvb_frontend ... request_firmware_work_func <= the firmware is ready load_firmware_cb <= but now the dvb_frontend has been freed To fix the issue, check the dvd_frontend in load_firmware_cb(), if it is null, report a warning and just return. [1]: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in load_firmware_cb+0x1310/0x17a0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8000d7ca2308 by task kworker/2:3/6504 Call trace: load_firmware_cb+0x1310/0x17a0 request_firmware_work_func+0x128/0x220 process_one_work+0x770/0x1824 worker_thread+0x488/0xea0 kthread+0x300/0x430 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Allocated by task 6504: kzalloc tuner_probe+0xb0/0x1430 i2c_device_probe+0x92c/0xaf0 really_probe+0x678/0xcd0 driver_probe_device+0x280/0x370 __device_attach_driver+0x220/0x330 bus_for_each_drv+0x134/0x1c0 __device_attach+0x1f4/0x410 device_initial_probe+0x20/0x30 bus_probe_device+0x184/0x200 device_add+0x924/0x12c0 device_register+0x24/0x30 i2c_new_device+0x4e0/0xc44 v4l2_i2c_new_subdev_board+0xbc/0x290 v4l2_i2c_new_subdev+0xc8/0x104 em28xx_v4l2_init+0x1dd0/0x3770 Freed by task 6504: kfree+0x238/0x4e4 tuner_remove+0x144/0x1c0 i2c_device_remove+0xc8/0x290 __device_release_driver+0x314/0x5fc device_release_driver+0x30/0x44 bus_remove_device+0x244/0x490 device_del+0x350/0x900 device_unregister+0x28/0xd0 i2c_unregister_device+0x174/0x1d0 v4l2_device_unregister+0x224/0x380 em28xx_v4l2_init+0x1d90/0x3770 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8000d7ca2000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 The buggy address is located 776 bytes inside of 2048-byte region [ffff8000d7ca2000, ffff8000d7ca2800) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffff7fe00035f280 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8000c001f000 index:0x0 flags: 0x7ff800000000100(slab) raw: 07ff800000000100 ffff7fe00049d880 0000000300000003 ffff8000c001f000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8000d7ca2200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8000d7ca2280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff8000d7ca2300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8000d7ca2380: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8000d7ca2400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== [2] Actually, it is allocated for struct tuner, and dvb_frontend is inside.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Add null checker before passing variables Checks null pointer before passing variables to functions. This fixes 3 NULL_RETURNS issues reported by Coverity.

Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/pm: Fix the null pointer dereference for vega10_hwmgr Check return value and conduct null pointer handling to avoid null pointer dereference.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/admgpu: fix dereferencing null pointer context When user space sets an invalid ta type, the pointer context will be empty. So it need to check the pointer context before using it

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/pm: Fix the null pointer dereference in apply_state_adjust_rules Check the pointer value to fix potential null pointer dereference

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Fix the null pointer dereference to ras_manager Check ras_manager before using it

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/pm: Fix the null pointer dereference for smu7 optimize the code to avoid pass a null pointer (hwmgr->backend) to function smu7_update_edc_leakage_table.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bridge: mcast: wait for previous gc cycles when removing port syzbot hit a use-after-free[1] which is caused because the bridge doesn't make sure that all previous garbage has been collected when removing a port. What happens is: CPU 1 CPU 2 start gc cycle remove port acquire gc lock first wait for lock call br_multicasg_gc() directly acquire lock now but free port the port can be freed while grp timers still running Make sure all previous gc cycles have finished by using flush_work before freeing the port. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in br_multicast_port_group_expired+0x4c0/0x550 net/bridge/br_multicast.c:861 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888071d6d000 by task syz.5.1232/9699 CPU: 1 PID: 9699 Comm: syz.5.1232 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5-syzkaller-00021-g24ca36a562d6 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/07/2024 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:114 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0xc3/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:601 br_multicast_port_group_expired+0x4c0/0x550 net/bridge/br_multicast.c:861 call_timer_fn+0x1a3/0x610 kernel/time/timer.c:1792 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1843 [inline] __run_timers+0x74b/0xaf0 kernel/time/timer.c:2417 __run_timer_base kernel/time/timer.c:2428 [inline] __run_timer_base kernel/time/timer.c:2421 [inline] run_timer_base+0x111/0x190 kernel/time/timer.c:2437

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: Fix null-ptr-deref in reuseport_add_sock(). syzbot reported a null-ptr-deref while accessing sk2->sk_reuseport_cb in reuseport_add_sock(). [0] The repro first creates a listener with SO_REUSEPORT. Then, it creates another listener on the same port and concurrently closes the first listener. The second listen() calls reuseport_add_sock() with the first listener as sk2, where sk2->sk_reuseport_cb is not expected to be cleared concurrently, but the close() does clear it by reuseport_detach_sock(). The problem is SCTP does not properly synchronise reuseport_alloc(), reuseport_add_sock(), and reuseport_detach_sock(). The caller of reuseport_alloc() and reuseport_{add,detach}_sock() must provide synchronisation for sockets that are classified into the same reuseport group. Otherwise, such sockets form multiple identical reuseport groups, and all groups except one would be silently dead. 1. Two sockets call listen() concurrently 2. No socket in the same group found in sctp_ep_hashtable[] 3. Two sockets call reuseport_alloc() and form two reuseport groups 4. Only one group hit first in __sctp_rcv_lookup_endpoint() receives incoming packets Also, the reported null-ptr-deref could occur. TCP/UDP guarantees that would not happen by holding the hash bucket lock. Let's apply the locking strategy to __sctp_hash_endpoint() and __sctp_unhash_endpoint(). [0]: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 10230 Comm: syz-executor119 Not tainted 6.10.0-syzkaller-12585-g301927d2d2eb #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/27/2024 RIP: 0010:reuseport_add_sock+0x27e/0x5e0 net/core/sock_reuseport.c:350 Code: 00 0f b7 5d 00 bf 01 00 00 00 89 de e8 1b a4 ff f7 83 fb 01 0f 85 a3 01 00 00 e8 6d a0 ff f7 49 8d 7e 12 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 28 84 c0 0f 85 4b 02 00 00 41 0f b7 5e 12 49 8d 7e 14 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b947c98 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff8880252ddf98 RCX: ffff888079478000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000012 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffff8993e18d R09: 1ffffffff1fef385 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1fef386 R12: ffff8880252ddac0 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f24e45b96c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ffcced5f7b8 CR3: 00000000241be000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: __sctp_hash_endpoint net/sctp/input.c:762 [inline] sctp_hash_endpoint+0x52a/0x600 net/sctp/input.c:790 sctp_listen_start net/sctp/socket.c:8570 [inline] sctp_inet_listen+0x767/0xa20 net/sctp/socket.c:8625 __sys_listen_socket net/socket.c:1883 [inline] __sys_listen+0x1b7/0x230 net/socket.c:1894 __do_sys_listen net/socket.c:1902 [inline] __se_sys_listen net/socket.c:1900 [inline] __x64_sys_listen+0x5a/0x70 net/socket.c:1900 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f24e46039b9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 91 1a 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f24e45b9228 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000032 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f24e468e428 RCX: 00007f24e46039b9 RDX: 00007f24e46039b9 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f24e468e420 R08: 00007f24e45b96c0 R09: 00007f24e45b96c0 R10: 00007f24e45b96c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f24e468e42c R13: ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix to do sanity check on F2FS_INLINE_DATA flag in inode during GC syzbot reports a f2fs bug as below: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inline.c:258! CPU: 1 PID: 34 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-syzkaller-00012-g9e4bc4bcae01 #0 RIP: 0010:f2fs_write_inline_data+0x781/0x790 fs/f2fs/inline.c:258 Call Trace: f2fs_write_single_data_page+0xb65/0x1d60 fs/f2fs/data.c:2834 f2fs_write_cache_pages fs/f2fs/data.c:3133 [inline] __f2fs_write_data_pages fs/f2fs/data.c:3288 [inline] f2fs_write_data_pages+0x1efe/0x3a90 fs/f2fs/data.c:3315 do_writepages+0x35b/0x870 mm/page-writeback.c:2612 __writeback_single_inode+0x165/0x10b0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1650 writeback_sb_inodes+0x905/0x1260 fs/fs-writeback.c:1941 wb_writeback+0x457/0xce0 fs/fs-writeback.c:2117 wb_do_writeback fs/fs-writeback.c:2264 [inline] wb_workfn+0x410/0x1090 fs/fs-writeback.c:2304 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa12/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x2f2/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 The root cause is: inline_data inode can be fuzzed, so that there may be valid blkaddr in its direct node, once f2fs triggers background GC to migrate the block, it will hit f2fs_bug_on() during dirty page writeback. Let's add sanity check on F2FS_INLINE_DATA flag in inode during GC, so that, it can forbid migrating inline_data inode's data block for fixing.