An issue was discovered in the auth component in Dovecot 2.2 and 2.3 before 2.3.20. When two passdb configuration entries exist with the same driver and args settings, incorrect username_filter and mechanism settings can be applied to passdb definitions. These incorrectly applied settings can lead to an unintended security configuration and can permit privilege escalation in certain configurations. The documentation does not advise against the use of passdb definitions that have the same driver and args settings. One such configuration would be where an administrator wishes to use the same PAM configuration or passwd file for both normal and master users but use the username_filter setting to restrict which of the users is able to be a master user.

Having a large number of address headers (From, To, Cc, Bcc, etc.) becomes excessively CPU intensive. With 100k header lines CPU usage is already 12 seconds, and in a production environment we observed 500k header lines taking 18 minutes to parse. Since this can be triggered by external actors sending emails to a victim, this is a security issue. An external attacker can send specially crafted messages that consume target system resources and cause outage. One can implement restrictions on address headers on MTA component preceding Dovecot. No publicly available exploits are known.

Very large headers can cause resource exhaustion when parsing message. The message-parser normally reads reasonably sized chunks of the message. However, when it feeds them to message-header-parser, it starts building up "full_value" buffer out of the smaller chunks. The full_value buffer has no size limit, so large headers can cause large memory usage. It doesn't matter whether it's a single long header line, or a single header split into multiple lines. This bug exists in all Dovecot versions. Incoming mails typically have some size limits set by MTA, so even largest possible header size may still fit into Dovecot's vsz_limit. So attackers probably can't DoS a victim user this way. A user could APPEND larger mails though, allowing them to DoS themselves (although maybe cause some memory issues for the backend in general). One can implement restrictions on headers on MTA component preceding Dovecot. No publicly available exploits are known.

Не работает control dovecot-auth

Некорректно указана принадлежность к группе у создаваемых с помощью tmpfiles.d каталога /run/dovecot/login

Просьба собрать dovecot с поддержкой fts_solr

в dovecot отсутствует libmech_gssapi.so и libauth_ldap.so

Оторвать от sysvinit