Уязвимость сервера DNS BIND, связанная с переполнением буфера в стеке при работе BIND в качестве «резолвера», позволяющая нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании

Уязвимость демона named DNS-сервера BIND, позволяющая нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании

Уязвимость сервера DNS BIND, связанная с выделением неограниченной памяти, позволяющая нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании

Every `named` instance configured to run as a recursive resolver maintains a cache database holding the responses to the queries it has recently sent to authoritative servers. The size limit for that cache database can be configured using the `max-cache-size` statement in the configuration file; it defaults to 90% of the total amount of memory available on the host. When the size of the cache reaches 7/8 of the configured limit, a cache-cleaning algorithm starts to remove expired and/or least-recently used RRsets from the cache, to keep memory use below the configured limit. It has been discovered that the effectiveness of the cache-cleaning algorithm used in `named` can be severely diminished by querying the resolver for specific RRsets in a certain order, effectively allowing the configured `max-cache-size` limit to be significantly exceeded. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.16.41, 9.18.0 through 9.18.15, 9.19.0 through 9.19.13, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.16.41-S1, and 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.15-S1.

A `named` instance configured to run as a DNSSEC-validating recursive resolver with the Aggressive Use of DNSSEC-Validated Cache (RFC 8198) option (`synth-from-dnssec`) enabled can be remotely terminated using a zone with a malformed NSEC record. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.16.8-S1 through 9.16.41-S1 and 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.15-S1.

If the `recursive-clients` quota is reached on a BIND 9 resolver configured with both `stale-answer-enable yes;` and `stale-answer-client-timeout 0;`, a sequence of serve-stale-related lookups could cause `named` to loop and terminate unexpectedly due to a stack overflow. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.16.33 through 9.16.41, 9.18.7 through 9.18.15, 9.16.33-S1 through 9.16.41-S1, and 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.15-S1.

The code that processes control channel messages sent to `named` calls certain functions recursively during packet parsing. Recursion depth is only limited by the maximum accepted packet size; depending on the environment, this may cause the packet-parsing code to run out of available stack memory, causing `named` to terminate unexpectedly. Since each incoming control channel message is fully parsed before its contents are authenticated, exploiting this flaw does not require the attacker to hold a valid RNDC key; only network access to the control channel's configured TCP port is necessary. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.2.0 through 9.16.43, 9.18.0 through 9.18.18, 9.19.0 through 9.19.16, 9.9.3-S1 through 9.16.43-S1, and 9.18.0-S1 through 9.18.18-S1.

Уязвимость функции derive_collocated_motion_vectors (motion.cc) реализации видеокодека h.265 Libde265, позволяющая нарушителю оказать воздействие на конфиденциальность, целостность и доступность защищаемой информации

Уязвимость функции decoder_context::p rocess_slice_segment_header (decctx.cc) реализации видеокодека h.265 Libde265, позволяющая нарушителю оказать воздействие на конфиденциальность, целостность и доступность защищаемой информации

Libde265 v1.0.11 was discovered to contain a segmentation violation via the function decoder_context::process_slice_segment_header at decctx.cc.

Libde265 v1.0.11 was discovered to contain a heap buffer overflow via the function derive_collocated_motion_vectors at motion.cc.

v1.0.12 (security fixes)