ImageMagick is a free and open-source software suite, used for editing and manipulating digital images. The `AppImage` version `ImageMagick` might use an empty path when setting `MAGICK_CONFIGURE_PATH` and `LD_LIBRARY_PATH` environment variables while executing, which might lead to arbitrary code execution by loading malicious configuration files or shared libraries in the current working directory while executing `ImageMagick`. The vulnerability is fixed in 7.11-36.

ImageMagick: lost fftw3 support

Уязвимость почтового сервера Dovecot, связанная с неограниченным распределением ресурсов, позволяющая нарушителю выполнить отказ в обслуживании

Уязвимость почтового сервера Dovecot, связанная с распределением ресурсов без ограничений и регулирования, позволяющая нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании

Having a large number of address headers (From, To, Cc, Bcc, etc.) becomes excessively CPU intensive. With 100k header lines CPU usage is already 12 seconds, and in a production environment we observed 500k header lines taking 18 minutes to parse. Since this can be triggered by external actors sending emails to a victim, this is a security issue. An external attacker can send specially crafted messages that consume target system resources and cause outage. One can implement restrictions on address headers on MTA component preceding Dovecot. No publicly available exploits are known.

Very large headers can cause resource exhaustion when parsing message. The message-parser normally reads reasonably sized chunks of the message. However, when it feeds them to message-header-parser, it starts building up "full_value" buffer out of the smaller chunks. The full_value buffer has no size limit, so large headers can cause large memory usage. It doesn't matter whether it's a single long header line, or a single header split into multiple lines. This bug exists in all Dovecot versions. Incoming mails typically have some size limits set by MTA, so even largest possible header size may still fit into Dovecot's vsz_limit. So attackers probably can't DoS a victim user this way. A user could APPEND larger mails though, allowing them to DoS themselves (although maybe cause some memory issues for the backend in general). One can implement restrictions on headers on MTA component preceding Dovecot. No publicly available exploits are known.