This flaw allows a malicious HTTP server to set "super cookies" in curl that are then passed back to more origins than what is otherwise allowed or possible. This allows a site to set cookies that then would get sent to different and unrelated sites and domains. It could do this by exploiting a mixed case flaw in curl's function that verifies a given cookie domain against the Public Suffix List (PSL). For example a cookie could be set with `domain=co.UK` when the URL used a lower case hostname `curl.co.uk`, even though `co.uk` is listed as a PSL domain.

When saving HSTS data to an excessively long file name, curl could end up removing all contents, making subsequent requests using that file unaware of the HSTS status they should otherwise use.

A malicious HTTP sender can use chunk extensions to cause a receiver reading from a request or response body to read many more bytes from the network than are in the body. A malicious HTTP client can further exploit this to cause a server to automatically read a large amount of data (up to about 1GiB) when a handler fails to read the entire body of a request. Chunk extensions are a little-used HTTP feature which permit including additional metadata in a request or response body sent using the chunked encoding. The net/http chunked encoding reader discards this metadata. A sender can exploit this by inserting a large metadata segment with each byte transferred. The chunk reader now produces an error if the ratio of real body to encoded bytes grows too small.

The filepath package does not recognize paths with a \??\ prefix as special. On Windows, a path beginning with \??\ is a Root Local Device path equivalent to a path beginning with \\?\. Paths with a \??\ prefix may be used to access arbitrary locations on the system. For example, the path \??\c:\x is equivalent to the more common path c:\x. Before fix, Clean could convert a rooted path such as \a\..\??\b into the root local device path \??\b. Clean will now convert this to .\??\b. Similarly, Join(\, ??, b) could convert a seemingly innocent sequence of path elements into the root local device path \??\b. Join will now convert this to \.\??\b. In addition, with fix, IsAbs now correctly reports paths beginning with \??\ as absolute, and VolumeName correctly reports the \??\ prefix as a volume name. UPDATE: Go 1.20.11 and Go 1.21.4 inadvertently changed the definition of the volume name in Windows paths starting with \?, resulting in filepath.Clean(\?\c:) returning \?\c: rather than \?\c:\ (among other effects). The previous behavior has been restored.

On Windows, The IsLocal function does not correctly detect reserved device names in some cases. Reserved names followed by spaces, such as "COM1 ", and reserved names "COM" and "LPT" followed by superscript 1, 2, or 3, are incorrectly reported as local. With fix, IsLocal now correctly reports these names as non-local.

Using go get to fetch a module with the ".git" suffix may unexpectedly fallback to the insecure "git://" protocol if the module is unavailable via the secure "https://" and "git+ssh://" protocols, even if GOINSECURE is not set for said module. This only affects users who are not using the module proxy and are fetching modules directly (i.e. GOPROXY=off).

При использовании утилиты, уведомление: Use of uninitialized value $platform in hash element at /usr/bin/inxi line 16284